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Abstract
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilis-
tic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving
the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states.
These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or
having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win.
Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed
bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory
also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a con-
ventional first price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus
to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex eco-
nomic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of
related auctions or involving allocative externalities.
1 Introduction
Auctions usually have a well-defined decision rule to determine which bid-
der, if any, wins the auction. In these cases, the outcome is a deterministic
function of the submitted bids. More generally, an auction may include var-
ious informal or loosely defined preferences, such as a diversity of winners
to avoid too much concentration in a single supplier, an extreme bid sug-
gesting a low quality supplier, or public policy requirements [23]. To the
extent these factors are not clearly expressed to participants or are not fully
evaluated until after the auction, bidders face some uncertainty on how the
auction winner will be selected, e.g., whether the highest bidder will win.
While such additional criteria can be complicated, an approach to under-
standing their effect on bidder behavior is to treat the auction outcome as
probabilistic. That is, while traditional auction criteria, such as the amount
bid, affect the winner selection, the relation is probabilistic rather than de-
terministic.
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More speculative examples of probabilistic auctions are quantum auc-
tions [19, 18], where bidders use quantum states to express their bids. Such
auctions use quantum information processing [26] both to express the bids
and determine the winner(s). A potential benefit of quantum auctions is
helping to preserve privacy of the losing bids: the observation at the end
of the protocol to determine the winner also destroys the quantum state
encoding the bidders’ behavior. Cryptographic methods can also hide in-
formation [25] through the presumed computational difficulty of breaking
the code. However, cryptographic approaches retain the information after
completing the protocol, which may be revealed if the corresponding keys
become available, either accidentally or intentionally. Moreover, the political
context of some auctions can lead to difficulties in using economically effi-
cient methods when information, beyond just the winner and price, remains
available [23]. Quantum auctions could provide an attractive alternative to
address these concerns. Quantum auctions, through using entangled states,
also offer a privacy-preserving approach to scenarios in which one bidder
cares about what another bidder wins (called an “allocative externality”),
and allow compact expression of bids for combinatorial auctions [10].
Other examples of quantum economic mechanisms include encouraging
cooperation in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma [13, 14, 11, 12], coordi-
nation [20, 24], the minority game [16] and public goods provisioning [7]. In
particular, a quantum public-goods mechanism can significantly reduce the
free-rider problem without a third-party enforcer or repeated interactions,
both in theory and practice [6]. Technology for manipulating and communi-
cating just a few qubits could be sufficient to implement such mechanisms.
The use of quantum information for economic mechanisms contrasts with the
attention given to computational advantages [28, 17] of quantum computers
with many qubits, which are much more difficult to implement physically
than few-qubit economic applications.
A key question for economic mechanisms is how well they perform. In
this paper we consider this question for a quantum auction protocol [19]
that mimics the conventional first-price sealed-bid auction. In this type of
conventional auction, participants each submit a single bid, without knowl-
edge of the bids submitted by others. This contrasts with the more common
open outcry auctions where bidders learn each others bids and can choose to
increase their bid if someone else bids higher. Moreover, in first-price auc-
tions, the winner is the bidder submitting the highest bid, and the winner
pays the amount of that bid. We focus on the first-price sealed-bid auction
due to its simplicity.
A core issue is whether the probabilistic auction protocol, with the ap-
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propriate design, performs as well as an efficient deterministic auction of
the same items. A partial game theoretic analysis of this quantum auction
indicates how ideal rational players would react to the probabilistic nature
of the outcomes [19]. In particular, this analysis indicates design details of
the distributed quantum search to find the winner affect the game theory
incentives and the resulting auction efficiency.
However, there are many reasons to be skeptical of game theory predic-
tions of human decision-making behavior. One particularly relevant issue is
that standard theory has difficulty predicting how people make decisions un-
der uncertainty [22, 1]. In the quantum auction, bidders face three different
types of uncertainty. First, they do not know other bidders’ valuation of the
item. Second, they do not know how other bidders will bid as a function of
their values, a form of “strategic uncertainty” that, in some cases, is useful
in encouraging more participation in the auction than would be the case for
rational bidders [23]. To some extent, game theory assumes away this strate-
gic uncertainty by having everyone use the equilibrium strategy. The last
type of uncertainty, unique to probabilistic auctions, comes from the ability
of the bidders to change winning probabilities by manipulating the auction
protocol. That is, the winning probabilities are not exogenously given val-
ues, but instead determined by the bidders’ behaviors. Other situations
often leading to poor predictive performance of game theory include situ-
ations with multiple equilibria or mixed strategy equilibria, where rational
players select among their available choices according to a probability distri-
bution. Moreover, in some cases people may use non-equilibrium strategies
that are more Pareto efficient than the Nash equilibrium, e.g., cooperating
to some extent in single prisoner’s dilemma situations. These features often
occur in quantum games, including the quantum auction protocol evaluated
in this paper. Thus, it is important to test quantum auctions with real hu-
man bidders, rather than relying only on game theory analyses, to evaluate
their suitability for real world applications.
In this paper, we report a series of economic experiments, using hu-
man subjects, designed to test whether people can perform successfully in
quantum auctions. Our experiments compare the two existing protocols for
quantum auctions [19]. Furthermore, we test whether game theory predicts
how people bid in quantum auctions. Since we examine human behavior
in a controlled laboratory setting, it is sufficient to simulate the behavior
of the quantum auctions with conventional computers for our experiments.
Thus we can evaluate the performance and potential usefulness of economic
applications relying on few-qubit quantum information processing prior to
their physical implementation.
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The remainder of this paper describes a quantum auction protocol, our
experiment design and the results comparing both conventional determin-
istic auctions and probabilistic auctions based on the quantum protocols
simulated with conventional computers.
2 A Quantum Auction Protocol
The quantum auction [19] uses quantum superpositions to represent bids
and adiabatic quantum search [15] to identify the winning bid. The overall
procedure for the bidders and auctioneer is as follows. The auctioneer starts
by creating a set of quantum physical systems in a specified initial state.
This set has one system for each bidder, which consists of a number of
qubits. The protocol proceeds through a series of rounds which implement
a distributed version of an adiabatic search. In each round, the auctioneer
starts with all the quantum systems, performs an operation on them and
then sends one system to each bidder. Each bidder performs an operation on
the system received from the auctioneer and then returns it to the auctioneer.
After completing all the rounds, the auctioneer measures all the quantum
systems to obtain a unique outcome for the auction while simultaneously
destroying the bid states. Thus the bids of the losing bidders are never
revealed. This protocol includes outcomes in which none of the bidders win,
which is analogous to conventional auctions with a reservation price: if no
one bids at least that much, the seller keeps the item.
Each bidder privately selects their operator. Nominally, this bidder op-
erator corresponds to the bid they wish to place according to an encoding
announced prior to the auction. In this case, after sufficiently many rounds,
the adiabatic theorem gives high probability that when the auctioneer mea-
sures the final state of the quantum systems, the observations will indicate
the highest bid and the corresponding bidder. This outcome arises through
the choice of operators and initial states for the quantum systems. Specifi-
cally, the bidders’ operators place the quantum systems in the ground state
of an initial Hamiltonian. During the subsequent rounds, the auctioneer
gradually changes the operation performed until the final Hamiltonian cor-
responds to the value of each outcome to the auctioneer, with the ground
state having the highest value. Typically this value is the revenue received
by the auctioneer.
Bidder operators constrain the state to only have nonzero amplitudes
among outcomes bidders are willing to pay, so the adiabatic search finds the
highest-revenue state consistent with the bidders’ choices. This process can
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be viewed as an adiabatic search constrained to a subspace of all possible
outcomes rather than finding the global state of maximum revenue for the
auctioneer, which would amount to asking bidders to pay the maximum
possible price.
This protocol has two distinct reasons for probabilistic outcomes. First,
the auctioneer may not perform enough rounds to satisfy the adiabatic the-
orem, in which case amplitude may spread among various eigenstates and
lead the final observation to give outcomes other than the ground state.
Second, a bidder may strategically choose an operator different from that
corresponding to the intended bid. Such choices can form an initial state for
the adiabatic search that is not the ground state of the initial Hamiltonian,
but instead some superposition of eigenstates of the initial Hamiltonian. In
this case, a slow adiabatic search will produce a corresponding mixture of
eigenstates of the final Hamiltonian, resulting in probabilistic outcomes for
the auctioneer’s measurement. In particular, such choices could give some
probability for low bidders to win.
Our experiments consider the choices bidders make, so we focus on this
second source of probabilistic outcomes. Thus we take the auctioneer to
use enough rounds to satisfy the adiabatic theorem with probability close
enough to one that outcomes violating the adiabatic theorem do not occur
in our limited set of experiments.
A single bidder, having only one of the quantum systems to operate on,
cannot form arbitrary initial states of the full set. Thus an important con-
sideration for the auction design is the range of excited states of the Hamil-
tonian available to a single bidder. Game theory suggests simple changes
in the design of the Hamiltonian (as implemented by the auctioneer) sig-
nificantly affects the strategic behavior of players by changing the available
excited states to a single bidder [19]. Testing the effect of such changes on
actual human decision-makers is the key focus of the experiments described
below.
3 Economic Experiments
Game theory, along with traditional economic theory, is the standard theory
for human decision-making in economic contexts. This theory makes strong
assumptions of rationality, including: a) each decision-maker is selfish and
maximizes his or her preferences, b) they make no mistakes, and c) they
know that all the other decision-makers are rational. While these assump-
tions are not accurate descriptions of how people actually make decisions,
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game theory provides key insights into strategic decision-making behavior
with fairly accurate predictions in some contexts.
Since Chamberlain [2] and Smith [29], there has been growing interest in
using economic experiments [21] to understand the behavioral factors affect-
ing decisions. These factors include, but not limited to, those arising from
social preferences (how people deal with each other), individual bounded
rationality (how people make mistakes in decisions) and uncertainty [22]. In
an experiment, human subjects are recruited to play the roles of decision
makers and receive monetary rewards based on their profits during the ex-
periment. Subjects receive a full description about the experiment with no
deception. Anonymity with respect to roles and payment is preserved.
While no one expects subjects to engage in complicated mathematical
calculations during experiments, there is ample evidence that subjects with
adequate training and instructions can make good decisions within a labo-
ratory setting where they only have limited amounts of time. For example,
subjects respond strategically to nonlinearities in a first price auction when
given about one minute to make their bidding decisions [9, 8]. These auc-
tion experiments involve bidding decisions that are a bit less complicated
than the experiments we report in this paper, which allowed a bit more
time for each decision. As another point of comparison, an experiment with
much more complicated decisions than our experiments allowed subjects 5
to 10 minutes for each decision [3]. Moreover, subjects without specific do-
main knowledge can make similar strategic choices to those trained to make
these choices, as examined, for example, with the complex task of allocating
multiple resources on the space station [27].
Previous work has also addressed how subjects learn about relevant as-
pects of the game through interacting with the software as opposed to being
given a precise mathematical description. One example using decision sup-
port to convey key aspects of a complex game is experiments with electricity
markets [4]. Another example is an experiment with a manufacturing sys-
tem with complicated demand function [5]. The demand function was only
shown to the subjects through a software decision support tool. No explicit
formulae or tables were given. The authors found that participants made
effective decisions based only on these tools and thus successfully identified
behavior patterns driven by changes in contract policies. This approach
using “what if” scenario tools is similar our method of instructing subjects
about the probabilities of winning the auctions in the experiments reported
in this paper.
Economic experiments have limitations, primarily with regard to involv-
ing small groups of people over short times (typically a dozen people making
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decisions over a period of a few hours). Thus some extrapolation is required
from experimental results to behavior of real economic institutions. Nev-
ertheless, such experiments provide a useful addition to game theory and
empirical observations of economic institutions. In particular, laboratory
experiments involve both real human decision-making and control over eco-
nomic variables (such as supply and demand, and the information exchanged
among participants). Game theory lacks the former property and empirical
observations of existing institutions lack the latter. Because of the limita-
tions of experiments and game theory, we cannot expect them to always give
quantitative predictions for how large groups of people would behave in real-
world situations. Instead experiments, by incorporating behavioral effects
of real decision making, can indicate how different mechanisms likely will
compare, e.g., which will likely work better. Such comparisons are sufficient
to help decide among competing mechanism choices, e.g., when designing
auctions.
4 Experiment Design
We conducted economics experiments to study actual behavior with proba-
bilistic auctions. We used auctions with exactly three bidders and simulated
the quantum auction protocol with conventional computers so the probabil-
ities of each outcome in the experiment corresponded to that of the auctions
with the given bidder inputs.
Each experiment consisted of a number of periods. At the beginning of
each period, subjects were grouped randomly into groups of three and each
group bid in their own auction. We determined the value for the auctioned
item for each bidder by randomly generating a value, between 0 and 100,
for each participant. Bidders then entered their choices and the auction
outcome was revealed. If a person won the auctioned item, he or she would
receive as profit the difference between their value for the item and the
amount of their bid. The groupings and bidder values were regenerated for
each subsequent period. At the end of the experiment, each person was paid
the total profit they had received in all periods (converted to dollars at a
preannounced exchange rate).
4.1 Experimental Treatments
Our experiments compared three treatments:
1. Classical First Price Sealed Bid Auction
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This classical auction has been well studied both theoretically and
experimentally. We included this treatment as a benchmark because
it is efficient in both theory and practice. In this treatment, in each
period, each subject entered a bid into the computer. The highest bid,
in each group of three, won the auction.
2. Quantum Auction with standard search
In this quantum auction, each subject entered a bid, as well as two
numbers we dubbed “x” and “y” for the auction. x and y are two
real numbers in the range from 0 to 12, with 12 equivalent to 0, as
on the face of a clock. Unknown to the subjects, these two numbers
determine a quantum operator specifying their bids for the initial state
of a subsequent distributed quantum search to find the winner [19],
using the standard quantum adiabatic search procedure [15].
The subjects saw an auction that requires each bidder to specify 3
numbers (a bid, x and y) instead of just one number (the bid) as in the
classical auction. Furthermore, as opposed to the highest bid always
winning, lower bids also have the possibility of winning depending
on the values of x, y and the bid of every bidder. Thus, this is a
probabilistic auction with the subjects having some control over the
probabilities. Moreover, there is also a chance that no one wins.
3. Quantum Auctions with permuted search
This auction is exactly the same as treatment 2 except that the prob-
ability of winning has a different dependency on the bids, x and y
values, corresponding to a permuted search with better performance
according to game theory [19]. If every bidder in an auction sets x to
0 and y to 3, then the probability of the highest bid winning is 1, and
this is a Nash equilibrium [19] at least with respect to changes in the
initial state.
Fig. 1 illustrates a difference between the standard and permuted search
methods by showing the probability the lowest bid wins as a function of the
x and y values that one bidder selects when the other two bidders select
x = 0 and y = 3. When all three bidders select x = 0 and y = 3, the highest
bidder always wins. With the standard search, in this situation each bidder
is tempted to change values to one of the peaks in this figure (e.g., x = 6 and
y = 3) giving a high chance to win with a low bid, and hence earn a large
profit from the auction. However, if the other bidders also make this choice
then there is always no winner for the auction. By contrast, the permuted
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Figure 1: The probability the lowest of three bidders wins as a function of x
and y values selected by that bidder when the other two bidders select x = 0
and y = 3 (values indicated by the large black point). The upper surface is
for the standard search and the lower surface (with zero probability for the
lowest bidder to win) is for the permuted search.
search method does not have this temptation: when the other bidders select
x = 0 and y = 3, there is no probability for either the lowest bid or the
second lowest bit to win no matter what the remaining bidder chooses.
Each experiment session was divided into two or three treatments as sum-
marized in Table 1. That is, we ran a series of periods using one treatment
and then switched to a different treatment. The subjects were notified be-
fore each new treatment took effect. We report a total of three experiments.
Two were conducted with Stanford students covering all three treatments.
The remaining experiment (number 2) was conducted with physicists from
HP Labs and only two of three treatments were used due to time constraints.
4.2 Subjects’ View of the Experiments
We provided experiment instructions to the subjects via the web1. The
subjects were told the decisions they were going to make, and the potential
consequences. They were also quizzed on the mechanics of the game via
the web site prior to coming to the lab for the actual experiment. We im-
1At www.hpl.hp.com/econexperiment/Quantum auction/instructions.htm
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experiment number of subjects treatment number of periods
1 12 classical 35
quantum standard 35
quantum permuted 31
2 6 classical 30
quantum permuted 40
3 12 classical 30
quantum standard 30
quantum permuted 30
Table 1: Summary of the experiments. The multiple treatments in each
experiment were done in the order listed.
plemented the experiments with the HP Experimental Economics Software
and followed standard procedures for economics experiments.
After the subjects arrived in the laboratory and before starting the ex-
periment, we reviewed the instructions for the series of auctions we would
conduct during the experiment. We emphasized the subjects will be bid-
ding in groups of three and these groupings will be randomized before each
auction. This randomization was done in the experimental software and did
not involve any physical rearrangement of the people in the room.
We described that subjects would be told their individual values for
winning the auction before the start of each auction. We further told the
subjects that a) their values are private meaning no other players see them,
b) the distribution of the values (uniform between 0 and 100) is known to
everyone, and c) the values would be randomized for every auction. To gain
familiarity with the interface and decisions, subjects played several training
periods before the actual experiment. In the training periods, subjects were
not paid for the outcome of the auction. The subjects were given about
90 seconds to make their decisions for each auction, although this rule was
relaxed somewhat in the training periods as well as the first few periods of
the game.
In the treatments with the quantum protocols, subjects were asked to
make three decisions for each period: a bid (the amount they had to pay
if they won), and two numbers between 0-12. We first explained to them
that 0 is equivalent to 12. Thus, the two numbers each behave like hours
on a clock. Second, we said these two numbers affect the probability that
the highest, second highest and the lowest bid wins the auction, as well
10
Current Period
Period Value Total Profit
1 96 0
Last Period Result
Value Bid X Y Bid Win? Winning Bid Profit
0 0 0 0 No No Winner 0
Decision
Bid X Y
0 9 6
Decisions Support Tool
Bid X Y Win Prob.
1 80 0 9 0.1861 80
2 0 9 6 0.0015 0
3 90 2 3 0.0000 90
No Winner 0.8124
Figure 2: User interface for making decisions. Another sheet in the interface
(not shown) listed the history of outcomes during the game. The user en-
tered choices for bid, x and y in the “Decision” section. Prior to submitting
their decision, they could investigate consequences of different choices they
and others might make in the support tool at the bottom, which showed
outcome probabilities corresponding to those choices.
as the probability for no winner. Third, we described the decision support
software tool that calculates the outcome probabilities given their decisions,
and assumed values for their opponents’ decisions. Using this tool, a subject
could enter a trial decision, i.e., values for the bid, x and y, and guesses of
the decisions of the other bidders. The computer would then display, in
table form, the probability of winning for each bidder and the probability of
there would be no winner. Fig. 2 shows the interface people used to make
their decisions and evaluate consequences of possible choices.
For the experiments with the Stanford students, we did not describe
the underlying physics or present equations relating the outcome probabil-
ities to their choices. The subjects learn about the relationships between
their decisions and the actual probability of winning by the use of the deci-
sion support tool. In the experiment involving physicists we also described
the quantum procedure underlying the auction and how the standard and
permuted search treatments corresponded to different quantum search pro-
cedures.
The end of the experiment and upcoming switches to a different treat-
ment were announced two periods in advance, a standard protocol in such
experiments.
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5 Results
Our experimental results allow quantifying and comparing the performance
of the three auctions. This section first describes several common measures
of auction performance and then uses these measures to present the experi-
mental outcomes.
5.1 Auction Evaluation Criteria
An key measure of auction outcome is the revenue, i.e., the amount the seller
receives from the auction. From the bidders’ perspective, the corresponding
measure is their expected payoff, i.e., item value minus amount bid if they
win, and zero otherwise.
Allocative efficiency is a standard measure of the efficiency of an eco-
nomic mechanism. Instead of measuring how much money the system gen-
erates (revenue), it measures whether the item is allocated to the person
with the highest value. Thus, it is defined as the ratio of the achieved value
to the maximum possible value. In the case of auctions, allocative efficiency
is simply the ratio of the value of the winning bidder to the highest value
amongst the bidders. Notice that a high allocative efficiency does not nec-
essarily imply high revenue. For auctions with no winner, the allocative
efficiency is defined to be zero, corresponding to a situation in which there
is no value for the seller keeping the item.
Bidders must balance a low bid, giving higher profit if they win, with a
high bid, giving a higher chance of winning. Bidders with high value can
make a profit even with a relatively high bid. Thus a measure giving insight
into bidder strategies is the ratio of amount bid to the item value for each
bidder.
5.2 Experimental Outcomes
We evaluated the auction outcomes with several criteria, listed in Table 2.
We report separately the averages over all auctions and bidders in each
treatment for each experiment (i.e., over all periods and all groups of three
in each period).
As context for our experiments, the results of the classical auctions are
consistent with previous studies. For example, subjects bid above 80% of
their values, as also seen in prior experiments [9, 8]. This similarity with
prior experiments suggests our experimental setup and subject pool are suf-
ficient to obtain behavior based on the economics forces in the mechanisms.
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mean allocative bid to value mean fraction
expt. treatment revenue efficiency ratio payoff no winner
1 classical 58(2) 97(1)% 75(2)% 4.3(0.4) N/A
q. standard 7(2) 34(4)% 18(2)% 6.1(0.7) 51%
q. permuted 14(2) 33(4)% 34(3)% 3.0(0.5) 59%
2 classical 56(2) 97(1)% 89(16)% 4.7(0.5) N/A
q. permuted 10(3) 36(5)% 33(4)% 5.5(0.9) 49%
3 classical 61(1) 97(1)% 87(8)% 4.5(0.3) N/A
q. standard 4(2) 31(4)% 14(2)% 6.5(0.9) 57%
q. permuted 8(2) 27(4)% 32(4)% 3.6(0.7) 66%
Table 2: Auction performance measures. Averages are over the auctions in
the corresponding experiment and treatment. Numbers in parentheses are
the standard error in the estimate of the average under the assumption of
independence among the auctions. The fraction of no winner applies only
to the quantum auctions and indicates the fraction of auctions that resulted
in none of the bidders winning the item.
A point of comparison for our observations with classical auctions is with
the predictions of game theory with risk-neutral bidders. For the uniform
distribution of values we use, theory predicts the equilibrium bidding strat-
egy with n bidders has a bid to value ratio of (n − 1)/n, which is 66.7%
for all our experiments since bidders competed in groups of three. Further-
more, with uniform values between 0 and 100, the expected largest value in
a group of three is 75, with a corresponding bid equal to 2/3 of this value,
i.e., 50. Thus this theory predicts average revenue for the classical auction
is 50, a bit lower than we observe experimentally. In fact, people are usually
risk-averse, which theory indicates leads to higher bids. Furthermore, game
theory predicts the allocative efficiency should be 100% since the highest
bid always wins and the predicted equilibrium bidding strategy has bids in-
creasing monotonically (in fact, linearly) with a bidder’s value. However in
practice, bidders vary somewhat from this ideal bidding behavior. Thus oc-
casionally a person with lower value outbids the person with highest value.
This situation is rare in our experiments as seen by the high allocative ef-
ficiency (∼ 97%) in all experiments. Similarly, theory predicts the average
payoff to the bidders: in this case 25 to the winner (75 average value minus
the bid of 50) and zero payoff to the two losing bidders, for an overall aver-
age payoff per bidder of 25/3 = 8.3. This payoff is higher than the values
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treatment highest middle lowest
q. standard 33% 21% 46%
q. permuted 56% 11% 33%
Table 3: For auctions with a winner, fraction won by highest, second highest
and lowest bids for the standard and permuted search quantum protocols.
we observe (4.3 to 4.7), again because people are bidding somewhat higher
than theory suggests.
Several conclusions on the quantum auctions can be drawn from the
experimental data. First, both types of quantum auctions, with the stan-
dard search and permuted search, resulted in significantly lower revenue and
allocative efficiency than the classical auction. The average revenue per auc-
tion dropped from around 60 in the classical auction to less than 10 for the
standard search treatment and around 10 to 15 for the permuted search.
Specifically, pairwise Wilcoxon tests comparing the classical auction with
each of the two quantum auctions indicate the differences in revenue, bid to
value ratio, mean payoff and allocative efficiency are statistically significant
with p-values less than 10−4. We can understand the lower allocative effi-
ciency as due largely to the significant fraction of quantum auctions with no
winner (since these cases give zero efficiency). The many cases of no winner
combined with the lower bids leads to the lower observed revenue.
Second, comparing the two quantum auctions, the permuted search re-
sulted in significantly higher revenue and bid to value ratio compared to the
standard search. Pairwise Wilcoxon tests indicate these differences are sta-
tistically significant with p-values less than 10−4. The better performance of
the permuted search protocol is consistent with theory [19]. In particular the
theory indicates the standard search gives bidders an incentive to attempt
to win with low bids, whereas the permuted search reduces this incentive by
requiring collusion among bidders to arrange for low bids to win (instead of
having no winner). Table 3 shows the permuted search has a much larger
fraction of winning auctions that are won by the highest bidder. This differ-
ence between the two methods is significant (p-value less than 10−4). Due to
the lower bids in the standard search, the mean payoff to bidders is higher in
the standard search than the permuted search (Wilcoxon test p-value 0.02).
However, the fraction of auctions with no winners in the two treatments is
not significantly different (p-value of the proportional test 0.29), nor is the
allocative efficiency (p-value of pairwise Wilcoxon test 0.42).
Third, we can dispel the notion that players were entering random x
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and y values because they were confused. The observation that behavior
changes systematically between the standard and permuted search methods
indicates users respond to the change in treatment. Furthermore, the bid to
value ratios were systematically below the 0.5 ratio that would arise from
selecting bids uniformly at random up to the bidders’ values. Instead, the
low ratios suggest people were often attempting to win with a low bid by
exploiting the possibility that the highest bid is not always the winner. Fi-
nally, the distribution of which bids won in auctions with a winner (Table 3)
is significantly different (p-value less than 10−4) from a uniform distribu-
tion that would arise if auctions were won randomly. These observations
are strong evidence that subjects were developing reasonable understanding
of the implications of their decisions and were responding to the strategic
opportunities of the auction protocol.
The large number of quantum auctions with no winner contributes sig-
nificantly to the lower performance we observed. Thus one key challenge
for the quantum auction is enabling coordination among bidders to avoid
choices leading to no winner (which give zero profit to all bidders). To quan-
tify the effect of this coordination problem, Table 4 shows the behavior for
the subset of quantum auctions that had a winner. For this subset of auc-
tions, revenue, allocative efficiency and payoff to the bidders are all higher,
as they must be since auctions without a winner contribute zero to these
measures. The bid to value ratio is also higher. Nevertheless, these values
still differ from the classical auction (p-value less than 10−4). From this
we conclude that coordination difficulties account for some, but not all, of
the difference in performance between the classical and quantum auctions.
In particular, even when bidders manage to coordinate, their strategy still
involves bidding fairly low, either based on expectation that others also will
bid low or in the hope of winning in spite of not having the highest bid.
Comparing the two quantum auctions for cases with a winner, we find
significantly higher revenue and bid to value ratio in the permuted vs. the
standard search (p-values less than 10−4). There is no significant difference
in allocative efficiency of the two methods among winning auctions (p-value
0.15).
By our measure of bidder strategy, the bid to value ratio, we find a sig-
nificant difference (p-values less than 0.01) in the ratios involved in auctions
with vs. without a winner when using the standard search method. For the
permuted search, ratios are higher but the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, at least for the standard search, users appear to adjust their
bidding strategy based on a sense of how much they expect to coordinate
with others to achieve a winning auction.
15
mean allocative bid to value mean
expt. treatment revenue efficiency ratio payoff
1 q. standard 14(3) 69(4)% 21(4)% 12.6(1.1)
q. permuted 35(4) 80(4)% 38(5)% 7.4(0.9)
2 q. permuted 20(4) 73(5)% 35(6)% 11.1(1.4)
3 q. standard 8(2) 72(5)% 20(4)% 15.3(1.5)
q. permuted 25(4) 80(5)% 36(9)% 10.7(1.5)
Table 4: Auction performance measures for the quantum auctions that had
a winner. Numbers in parentheses are the standard error in the estimate of
the average.
6 Conclusions
In summary, we conducted a series of experiments to determine if individ-
uals can bid reasonably in a quantum auction protocol. We conclude that
subjects can react to the strategic consideration of the auctions. In particu-
lar, the quantum protocol with permuted search outperformed, with respect
to efficiencies and revenue, the one with standard search. This is consistent
with prior game theory analysis.
However, both treatments with quantum auctions resulted in substan-
tially lower revenue and efficiencies than classical first price auction. This
was largely driven by a much higher percentage of “no winner” situations
when subjects tried to manipulate the winning probabilities through their
choices of x and y. Since these cases of no winner can be avoided with
suitable choices of x and y, an interesting question is whether with further
experience participants would learn to avoid these no winner situations and
thereby increase their profits.
There are several directions for future work. First, the fact that subjects
responded to mechanism changes opens the possibility of redesigning the
protocol to improve efficiencies and revenue. Second, this research has only
focused on the quantum auction protocol in isolation. It would be interest-
ing to analyze and conduct experiments with the same protocol in a larger
economic context (for example, where information about bids can be used
in future auctions) to see if the protocol has any benefits over traditional
auctions. The current experiments lack such context, but indicate the quan-
tum auction will only be economically beneficial if its other properties (such
as information privacy over repeated interactions among the same group of
bidders) outweigh their lower revenue and efficiency.
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We found that while quantum auctions were not as efficient as classi-
cal auctions, subjects were responsive to design differences in the quantum
protocol. The experimental evidence suggests participants had a fairly good
understanding of the consequences of their decisions and responded to struc-
tural changes in the quantum protocol accordingly.
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